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Netscape 6 Released

Tuesday November 14th, 2000

Netscape 6 has been released. You can download the installer here.


#193 Another Microsoft History Lesson

by Mike_Cornall

Saturday November 18th, 2000 12:59 PM

You are replying to this message

danielhill wrote:

> And Mike_Cornall's drivel about Microsoft's secret conspiracy theory is quite simply a joke.

Don't be silly. There's no secret conspiracy. The conspiracy is right out in the open, where everyone, except fools and MS astroturfers, can see it.

But, I guess you need to see the evidence again . . .

1. MICROSOFT DOES USE HIDDEN CALLS

From Caldera/DR-DOS vs Microsoft: <http://www.drdos.com/fullstory/factstat.html>

Bill Gates (Sept. 22/98):

> "You never sent me a response on the question of what things an app would do that would make it run with MSDOS and not run with DR-DOS. Is there any version check or api that they fail to have? Is ther feature they have that might get in our way? I am not looking for something they cant get around. I am looking for something that their current binary fails on."

Phil Barrett (reply to Gates):

> "Here follow the three "differences" (between DR and MS DOS) that Aaron has been able to find so far. Except for these differences, the two OSs behave similarly, including undocumented calls."

2. MICROSOFT DOES USE SABOTAGE

From Sun/Java vs Microsoft: <http://java.sun.com/lawsuit/051498.unfair.html>

Microsoft J++ Pricing Proposal:

> The "strategic objective" is to "migrate and lock Java developers to Win32 Java," and to "kill cross-platform Java by grow[ing] the polluted Java market."

Memo re Java:

> "at this point its [sic] not good to create MORE noise around our win32 java classes. Instead we should just quietly grow j++ share and assume that people will take advantage of our classes without ever realizing they are building win32-only java apps."

3. MICROSOFT IS OUT TO ELIMINATE NETSCAPE

And I don't mean through honest competition.

From DOJ vs Microsoft: <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3800/msjudgex.htm>

Microsoft officials did not believe that Internet Explorer could compete with Netscape on its own merit:

Memo from Bill Gates (May 1995):

> "First we need to offer a decent client," but "this alone won't get people to switch away from Netscape."

Brad Chase (Late 1995):

> "We will bind the shell to the Internet Explorer, so that running any other browser is a jolting experience."

James Allchin (December 1996):

> "I don't understand how IE is going to win. The current path is simply to copy everything that Netscape does packaging and product wise. Let's [suppose] IE is as good as Navigator/Communicator. Who wins? The one with 80% market share."

James Allchin (January 1997):

> "Pitting browser against browser is hard since Netscape has 80% marketshare and we have 20%. . . . I am convinced we have to use Windows - this is the one thing they don't have. . . . We have to be competitive with features, but we need something more - Windows integration."

> "If you agree that Windows is a huge asset, then it follows quickly that we are not investing sufficiently in finding ways to tie IE and Windows together. This must come from you. . . . [Windows 98] must be a simple upgrade, but most importantly it must be killer on OEM shipments so that Netscape never gets a chance on these systems."

Christian Wildfeuer (February 1997):

> "The stunning insight is this: To make [users] switch away from Netscape, we need to make them upgrade to [Windows 98]. . . . It seems clear to me that it will be very hard to increase browser market share on the merits of IE 4 alone. It will be more important to leverage the OS asset to make people use IE instead of Navigator."

But Microsoft was still afraid that tying IE to Windows would not be enough to pressure users into giving up Netscape. Thus, Microsoft also started putting pressure on OEMs, ISPs, Apple, and others, to tie their services to Internet Explorer:

Cameron Myhrvold (April 1997) told colleagues that he:

> "had a hard time guiding the ISPs to IE loyalty even when I make them sign explicit terms and conditions in a legal contract."

Executive memo to Bill Gates (October 1995):

> "Content drives browser adoption, and we need to go to the top five sites and ask them, 'What can we do to get you to adopt IE?' We should be prepared to write a check, buy sites, or add features - basically do whatever it takes to drive adoption."

Bill Gates (June 1996):

> "I have 2 key goals in investing in the Apple relationship - 1) Maintain our applications share on the platform and 2) See if we can get them to embrace Internet Explorer in some way."

Ben Waldman (June 1997):

> "The pace of our discussions with Apple as well as their recent unsatisfactory response have certainly frustrated a lot of people at Microsoft. The threat to cancel Mac Office 97 is certainly the strongest bargaining point we have, as doing so will do a great deal of harm to Apple immediately. I also believe that Apple is taking this threat pretty seriously . . . ."

Bill Gates (June 1997):

> "Apple let us down on the browser by making Netscape the standard install." Gates then reported that he had already called Apple's CEO (Gil Amelio) to ask "how we should announce the cancellation of Mac Office . . . ."

Ben Waldman (February 1998):

> "Though the language of the agreement uses the word 'encourage,' I think that the spirit is that Apple should be using [Internet Explorer] everywhere and if they don't do it, then we can use Office as a club."

The purpose of the OEM and other deals was to make it impossible for Netscape to fight back, by cutting off their revenue stream. Or, in the words of Microsoft's Paul Maritz (as testified by Intel VP Steven McGeady):

> "We are going to cut off [Netscape's] air supply. Everything they're selling, we're going to give away for free."